Battle of Fredericksburg

The Hampshire Room for Local History has in its collection several diaries, letters, unpublished manuscripts and first-hand accounts of the war. Excerpts from these documents will be used to give accounts of the local regiments and soldiers experiences during the conflict.

The following account of the First Battle of Fredericksburg is from Brevet Major General Oliver Edwards' unpublished manuscript My Recollections of the Civil War:

          "Gen. Burnside divided camp into three grand divisions,- the First, or Right Grand Division under Gen. Sumner, the Centre Grand Division under Hooker and the Left under Franklin. Sumner moved first to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, Halleck was to have had the necessary Pontoons there by the time Sumner arrived. Our army reached Falmouth from Nov. 17th to about Nov. 20, but no Pontoons had arrived, and did not arrive for days, giving Lee time to occupy the “[Fredericksburg] line”, to fortify and establish his army in a position where one man should have equalled[sic] five men attacking in front, in defense of said position. This delay in taking possession of [Fredericksburg] and allowing Lee to oppose our crossing the Rappahannock made it necessary, in the opinion of our Commander, to establish a line on the high-lands opposite [Fredericksburg], and to mount heavy guns to cover the laying of pontoon bridges and the crossing of the same. The heights back of Fredericksburg and extending far above and below the city, properly fortified and defended were nearly impregnable. On these heights Lee constructed redoubt[s] and breastworks, and put into position about three hundred guns. Franklin’s Left Grand Division fronted the River below the city, and on the opposite or south side of the river, was a plain over three thousand yards wide, between the river and the heights occupied by Lee. It seemed possible to carry these heights in our front, and that here was the only part of the line that any real attempt should be made, but Franklin’s orders from Burnside left it discretionary with him whether he should assault in earnest or feint, and he chose to “feint”.

            On Dec. 11 Franklin’s Left Grand Division and one Div of Hooker’s were near our pontoons waiting for Sumner to effect a crossing, which could not be accomplished until commands were ferried over in pontoon boats and carried the enemy’s skirmish line. Then Sumner’s bridges were quickly completed and his crossing accomplished. It was decided at Franklin’s crossing to pass over but one brigade on the 11th, and that brigade to picket the south side with a strong skirmish line covering heads of our bridges. Gen. Devens volunteered for the hazardous service, and his brigade crossed and held the opposite bank during the night of Dec. 11th.

            In crossing a part of the 2nd R.W. Vols. led as skirmishers, Gen. Devens leading at the head of the 10th Mass. Vols. on one bridge and the 37th Mass. leading on the other bridge. Gen. Devens and I met as we rode up the opposite bank. We had recently had some trouble about getting a house to helter the typhoid sick of my regiment, and I was feeling bitterly towards my brave commander. In his kightly way he turned to me cordially, offering his hand, saying “Colonel, you and I are going into battle with feelings toward each other that should not exist. Let’s drop it and shake hands”. With a warm clasp of hands all ill feeling between us passed. I would not write of this incident only to show the chivalrous honor of that brilliant brave son of Massachusetts, General [Charles Devens].

            Gen. Devens formed his brigade to protect our “tete de pont”, his entire command under arms all night. No fires were allowed, of course it was too cold to sleep on arms and every man had to keep moving that his blood might be circulating. Daylight! Franklin’s commands rapidly cross the river and move to our left, while the rebel batteries on the heights give us a morning salute offering us shells for breakfast. Franklin was to open the battle. It has been stated by Mahan and Bowen that his orders were so vague that he could not have been expected to understand that Burnside expected him to make the chief attack, or this in substance. If this was so could he not have seen Burnside in person?

            About 10 A.M. Dec 13th 1862, the Battle of Fredericksburg, Va. opened by the advanced of the 1st Corps and the assault of Meades’s div 1st Corps supported by Gibbon’ Div. The attack was [against] the rebel Gen. Jackson’s Corps in three lines. Meade carried the first line of the enemy but was repulsed as the second line. Gibbons in support was also defeated and a counter charge by the enemy was broken by Birney’s brigade of the 3rd Corps Birney’s advantage was not pressed, and Franklin with nearly half the army at his command made no father attack. At noon on the right centre, the second Corps assaulted “[Marye’s] Heights”. At the foot of the steepest part of the heights was a road running nearly parallel with the heights, with a stone wall on the side of the road facing the 2nd Corps. This road was occupied by a strong rebel line. The heights were occupied by two lines of infantry and artillery, and fortified by redoubts connected by heavy breastworks. Thus defended by brave men, well commanded, the position was impregnable, and the slaughter that followed was unnecessary and inexcusable.

            French, and then Hancock’s divisions were torn and rent by grape[,] canister and rifle shot from the heights and the musketry from the stone wall. No more determined [charges] were ever made. The [intelligence] of rank and file taught them early in the assault that the position could not be taken by direct assault, but it was their duty to obey orders, and to falter was disgrace, so that they tried to get as near “the stone wall” as possible before they fell. It was sublime, and Couch’s 2nd Corps and the 9th Corps proved what grand soldiers they were, but to no avail. [Officers], warrant officers, rank and file, showed their heroism. One Color Sergeant-I think he was of the 20th Mass.-well to the front of his regiment, and his right arm broken by a bullet,-he caught the Color staff in his left hand and still advanced. His left arm is also quickly broken, and as the colors fall he kneels and with his mangled arms gathers the staff, pressing it to his breast, rises and still moves forward with the Colors floating over him until he was relieved.- This kind of spirit animated these charging columns, and if [Marye’s] Heights could have been carried, they would have been.

            Fragments of commands came back, but mostly when lines could get no further, or ceased to exist as lines. Those [who were] left[,] laid down among the dead and dying and wounded. Hooker’s command was now ordered to cross and renew the attack. Hooker after a personal reconnaissance, remonstrated against useless sacrifice of his command, and then charged with the bayonet to no use, but with terrible loss. Burnside desired then to personally lead his old Corps, the 9th[,] to a charge in a column of regiments by brigade, Div. front. His old Corps loved him, but its leaders protested, and the charge was not made.

            All day my regiment was held in reserve expecting orders to assault the heights. Early in the day the 37th Mass. lost its first man killed in battle by a shell wound. Later in the day we were moved to the left and put in position to cover our left from any attack by Stuart’s cavalry. We laid here until after dark under a sharp fire from Stuart’s artillery, from which I protected my regiment by moving forward under the shelter of a slight ridge. About 9 P.M. we returned to our old position. Sunday the 14th we were ordered nearer to the pontoon bridges, and drew rations. No further attempt was made to attack, and a forward movement by Stuart was repulsed by our artillery. It was understood that Burnside had on Saturday night determined to renew the attack on Sunday, but this was so strongly opposed by all our leading Generals that he gave it up.

            The morning of the 15th, Devens brigade again moved the front to the “Richmond road”, support a battery. The road embankment protected us from a severe artillery fire. As soon as it was dark the lines were rapidly withdrawn and the pontoon bridges were covered with hay to muffle the sounds of the crossing. Gen. Devens again volunteered for the post of danger, and asked that his brigade might have the honor to cover the retreat of Franklin’s command, and be the last to cross the bridges. Gen. Devens’ request was granted. His own and the Jersey Brigade forming the rear guard, covered the approach to the bridges. After all except the rear guard had crossed, the Jersey Brigade made its crossing and when they were over, last of all Devens’ Brigade made its crossing and when they were over, last of all Devens’ Brigade silently and sorrowfully withdrew. It was nearly daylight when we bivouacked on Stafford Heights. The retreat was the only success we had, and while it was masterly to withdraw from contact with the enemy over one hundred thousand men without losing a man or gun, yet cannot be enthusiastic over it. We are weakened by the loss of over 12,000 of our best soldiers ever known, and the loss of much confidence in our Commander and some of his Generals. The Rebels have lost less than half our loss, and though admiring the heroic fighting of our soldiers and subordinate officers, they laugh at our Generalship, and are really stronger for the fight."