Spotsylvania Courthouse

Oliver Edwards

“BATTLE OF THE ANGLE”

Spottsylvania May 12th 1864

               During the night of May 11th the 2nd Corps (having recrossed the river Po) was massed near the Landrum house ready to assault the enemies works at the point known as “The Angle”, at just before daylight on May 12th. The 1st and 2nd Div. of the 6th Corps were also massed near by, ready to co-operate with Hancock. This Angle, so called, was formed from the enemy’s lines running north from their left to the Angle, thence easterly to their extreme right; it was really an angle with the apex cut off, and the two lines of the angle connected by a wide curve; the ground covering this curve being known as The Angle. This being the weak point in the enemy’s lines was protected by extra heavy field works, of breastworks over 5 feet high strong enough to resist field artillery, and with a heavy headlog on works, and heavy traverses six feet high covered these guns from enfilading fire, a few paces to the rear was a natural covered way fromed[sic] from the depression or hollow that ran back nearly to the enemy’s second line, to our own front and left. This natural covered way enabled the enemy to move troops from their second line, to within about 30 paces of the Angle, without unmasking them to our view, and entirely covered from our fire. This crow or “Spottsylvania Angle” was defended by Gen. Edward Johnson’s splendid Div., of three Virginia, and one Louisiana brigades. The front of this position was also protected by Abattis, and the ground to the rear was covered with open woods, or grove, of large trees. Before it was light enough to see anything more than landmarks, Hancock rushed his men over the obstructions, and fortifications capturing Gen. Edward Jonson with most of his Div. and 18 guns. Gen. Johnson shook hands with our officers that he had graduated with at West Point, with apparent cordiality, fir names being used, but Gen. Stewart refused his hand declining any acquaintance; Gen. Johnson said to him “Don’t be a ---- fool”. Lee moved forward troops from

[page 80]his second line, and from his right to attack Hancock whose victorious Corps was in considerable disorder in consequence of forcing their way through the abbatis[sic], and over the fortifications. Hancock’s further advance was stopped, and he was obliged to withdraw to the outside of the fortifications using the reverse side to fight over to hold the works. My brigade was awakened before daylight by the “Din of Battle”, and in a few minutes our bugles sounded the assembly. A staff officer from Hd Qrs appeared, and gave me Gen. Wright’s order that, as my command was first under arms my brigade would move first, and at once via the Landrum house to the Angle. We passed the Landrum house, and came into line of battle in front of the Angle, the 10th Mass., on my right, 2nd R.I. in the center, and the 37th Mass. on my left, the 7th Mass. being on picquet. We advanced to within 100 yard of the Angle under fire, where we halted until about 5 A.M. when the enemy advanced to recapture their works. The Excelsior brigade 2nd Corps held the (our) right face of the Angle, and the right of my brigade connected with their left about 50 yards to the right of the traverses. the enemy attacked along my entire front in two lines, and came within 20 paces, but were swept away by the deadly fire from my brigade, and the left oblique fire of the excelsior brigade. The ground in front of the 10th Mass. and the Excelsior brigade was open, and the enemy’s natural covered way did not extend far enough to afford them any protection beyond the right of the 2nd R.I. The enemy did not again attack directly in front of the right face of the Angle. The enemy then massed in three lines in their covered way for a second attack, and I ordered that not a shot be fried until they were within 25 yards, then a direct fire of two regiments with an enfilading fire of one regiment. When I gave the order to fire the three lines were swept away, the living, and the wounded, who could walk disappeared in their covered way. The enemy now attacked the Excelsior brigade, and the 10th Mass. with a deadly enfilading fire from the breastworks, still held by them beyond the right of the Excelsior brigade; here the Excelsior brigade, and the 10th

[page 81]Mass. lost heavily, and it was apparent that as long as the enemy held possession of the works to our right, that with these works, and higher ground, they commanded the right face of the Angle and that the breastworks could not be occupied farther to the right than the traverses in front of the right of the 2nd R.I. regiment. The excelsior brigade and 10th Mass. were forced to retire, and they took position in support of my front. I formed the 10th Mass in right rear echelon to the 2nd R.I. It was under this deadly fire from the right that we lost that fine officer the brave Maj. Parker 10th Mass. who fell mortally wounded. The enemy having suffered terribly in three attempts to carry out lines now resorted to massing troops in their natural covered way, and attacking in open order in front of the 2nd R.I. and the 37th Mass. endeavoring to mass a strong,[sic] line directly on the their side of the breastworks. This obliged me to order constant of file firing. After the Excelsior brigade 2nd Corps and 10th Mass. were forced to vacate the breastworks on the right face of the angle Col. Upton with his brigade of Russel’s Div. 6th Corps put his brigade in the breastworks vacated by the 10th Mass and Excelsior brigade but he quickly found the enfilading fire was so severe that he retired from the works to the bottom of the slope in his rear, and directed the fire of his brigade up the slope of knoll over the parapet or breastworks;[sic] in his front were occupied by the enemy. It was important for Upton to occupy this position until the Rebels were driven from the works to our right, so as to admit of Upton’s occupying the breastworks in his front, and in case the enemy should come over the breastworks, that he would be prepared to repel them, but from this position he could inflict no loss on the enemy unless they appeared over the top of the breastworks, as the ground descended from the enemies’ side as well as from ours. Wheaton’s brigade 2nd Div. was still in the woods beyond the right of Upton, and the Vermont Brigade still further to the right. Bidwell’s brigade 2nd Div. moved up to Upton’s rear in support, but were so

[page 82]close that the two brigades were intermingled, and formed a mass of men the front firing up the slope. The left of my brigade connected with the right of Birney’s Div. 2nd Corps, the Excelsior brigade 2nd Corps, forming my 2nd line. The hollow or ravine in my front enabled the enemy to mass their lines in front of the 37th Mass., and 2nd R.I. entirely protected from our fire, with their left in front of the right of the 2nd R.I., and the traverses, within 30 paces of the breastworks, and their right in front of the left of the 37th Mass about 100 paces; it was this fact that made the enemy make such continuous and desperate attacks upon the 2nd R.I. and the 37th Mass. as in attacking the line to my left they were exposed to a deadly fire from some distance. Gen. Lee had decided that at all hazards he must retake the Angle, and command after command of fresh troops were massed for attacked on my front. It was stated by a prisoner that some of these commands pledged themselves to Gen. Lee to carry our position if he would refrain from personally leading the attack. The enemy fell by hundreds near to the breastworks, and many affected lodgement thereon, but could not get over the works; my men and theirs firing under the same headlogs of the breastworks, and while “Old Glory” waved over the works from our side, so did the “Stars and Bars” from their side, but the heroes of the 37th Mass. and the 2nd R.I. did not yield an inch, but poured their deadly fire from under the headlog, stacking the dead in piles, and frequently using the bayonet on the enemy that had lodgement in his on the works. The third brigade of Russel’s Div. that had been supporting Birney’s Div. now moved up in rear of Upton, and was soon a part of a mass of men consisting of Upton’s, Bidwell’s and Eustis’ brigades. Eustis’ brigade had suffered some loss while fighting to our light, its gallant Adjt. Gen. Cha. A. Hurd being among the severely wounded. [THIS PART IS CROSSED OUT – “For a short time before Eustis brigade formed in rear of Bidwell, Upton claimed to command my front as well as his own by virtue of his seniority, and he crossed my front, and communicated personally with Gen. Birney. This lasted only until Eustis came up, and had no effect on the order of my front.”]

[page 83]The guns of the 37th Mass. became so hot that many of them were disabled, and some burst. I was obliged to move one of the 2nd Corps regiments supporting my front, in line close to the rear of the 37th, and have them exchange arms, passing their loaded guns in their right hands, and receiving the guns of the 37th in their left hands, as so determined, and constant was the attack of the enemy, that to have attempted to relieve the 37th from the works would have lost the works to us. The brigades of the 6th Corps to the right of the Angle, beyond Wheaton, after a sharp contest, drove the enemy from the breastworks, relieving Upton’s front, and part of mine from the enfilading fire of the enemy, making it practical to occupy the works in Upton’s front, and to relieve the terrible pressure on my front, by firing to the left oblique across my front; this I urged Upton to do, but he, and Bidwell said their brigades were so mixed together that they could not be moved. Eustis ranked Upton and Bidwell, and I urged my request upon him also, and proposed that we go in among their men and lead them to move up the breastworks, Upton and Bidwell went with me into the crowd, and tried to move them forward, but command was mixed with command so that they could not be moved forward, though all three of the brigades were splendid troops, and both Upton and Bidwell,[sic] were brave to a fault, and efficient officers. The enemy continued their desperate attempts to carry my front; officers were kept on the run distributing ammunition, as my front line could not be relieved, for any purpose until near 4 P.M., when the pressure was somewhat relieved so that I could withdraw the 37th, 10th Mass., and 2nd R.I. from the front line, relieving them with the supporting brigade of the 2nd Corps. My regiments drew at once fresh ammunition without retiring over 10 paces to the rear of the breastworks. Lieut. Col. Montague and Maj. Moody of the 37th Mass. had been wounded sometime before these regiments were relieved, but did not go to the hospital until now, leaving Capt. Hugh Donnelly in command of the 37th Mass. At 4 P.M. I received an order to report in person to Gen. Neil commanding our Div; as all was going well in my front (though the firing was

[page 84]incessant) I was able to leave long enough to report as ordered. I found Gen. D. A. Russel with Gen. Neil, and I reported that my brigade was much exhausted by their continuous fight and asked that they be relieved. Gen. Neil informed me that they could not be freely offered to command all night if he would relieve my brigade, saying that they were too exhausted to stand loading, and firing much longer, but Neil said his orders from Corps HdQrs were for me to hold my front and Upton’s, as Upton and Bidwell would be withdrawn as soon as dark. I left him feeling that the load imposed upon my brigade was heavier than they should have been expected to carry. Gen. Russel accompanied me to our lines, and said “It is too bad, Edwards, but it cannot be helped now”. After seeing the mass of Upton’s, Eustis’, and Bidwell’s brigades, Gen. Russel said that he would go at once, and order a Jersey regiment (I think the 10th) of heavy artillery, about 1000 strong, to report to me, to man the breastworks in Upton’s front, when Upton and Bidwell could be relieved. Gen. Russel also said “If you are not relieved before morning, I will relieve you with one of my brigades by 6 A.M.” It was after 5 P.M. when the Jersey regiment reported, I moved them around Upton’s right and put them into the breastworks in front of Upton, by the movement of “on right by file into line.” I gave their Col. orders to commence file firing to the left oblique, this relieved the most dangerous pressure on the angle and Upton and Bidwell and Eustis soon after were withdrawn. About 6 P.M. my front line of 2nd Corps regiments were out of ammunition, and I relieved them with the 10th Mass. 2nd R.I. and one wing of the 37th Mass. I soon ordered my fire to slacken gradually, but finding the enemy kept up a hot fire on my front I was obliged to give them the same. The supply of ammunition was short during the day and very short at this period; we were obliged to gather ammunition from every dead and wounded man. A regiment to the left of my line suddenly withdrew from the breastworks without notifying me, and without authority, as far as I know, but with the

[page 85]excuse that they were out of ammunition, The wing of the 37th in reserve was sleeping the sleep of exhaustion, and were without ammunition, as their fresh supply had been distributed to the front line. I ordered them to fill the gap, and hold the works with their bayonets; like one man they responded to brave Capt. Donnelly’s orders, and charged forward to the breastworks, crossing their bayonets at the headlog on top,[sic] The commander of the supporting brigade form the 2nd Corps, now attempted to relieve his brigade, and march to the 2nd Corps without authority, saying they had no ammunition and nothing to eat. I was obliged to call for a file of men, and he obeyed my orders with their guns pointing at him. This brigade had done splendid service all day, and were on duty all the night previous; they were detached from their Corps, hungry, exhausted, and under the command of a stranger; some of its regiments’ time was almost out, and every time I called up on them would reply “All right, we have only so many days to serve; give us all the fighting you can”. This I mean was the reply of a Capt. in command of one of these regiments; all of them were grand regiments, and I do not intend to reflect in the least on them or their commander, but it was my duty to hold them until they or I properly relieved. After 2 A.M. the supply of ammunition was abundant, and at 3 A.M. the enemy’s fire nearly ceased. I at once put a line of skirmishers over the breastworks, and found the enemy was  retiring; my skirmishers captured one 1 Capt., 1 Lieut., and 60 men. The ground in my front was thickly strewn with dead; in some places they had fallen in piles. I saw a hand move under a pile of dead men, and having the dead removed found a Rebel Col. badly wounded by alive. At 6.30 P.M. Gen Russel in person relieved me with one of his brigades, and I withdrew my command to near the Landrum house. My exhausted soldiers laid down in the mud as soon as arms were stacked, too tired to even make coffee or eat. Gen. Lee did not cease his attack until 3 A.M. when he had completed a new line of works about 1500 yards in rear of the Angle. My command was engaged in close, hot fighting from

[page 86]about 5 A.M. May 12th to 3 A.M. May 13th (22 hours) This shows that my front was the main point of attack. The heavy traverses, or enfilading fire, also showed my front to have been the crown or apex of the angle. The line of the enemy’s enfilading fire across Upton’s front, and down the line of the 10th Mass. to the 2nd Company to the right of the 2nd R.I. passed then to the rear of the 2nd R.I. and 37th Mass until opposite the left of the 37th Mass. the enfilading fire was about 50 yards in their rear. These facts certainly prove the location of the Angle. As the Battle of the Angle (after Hancock’s magnificent charge) was no part of the plans of Gen. Grant, it was not considered of much importance by us, but the Richmond Whig of May 18th 1864, showed that the enemy considered it of very great importance, and that the defence was the most heroic they had ever met on part of the Yanks. The survivors of the 37th Mass and the 2nd R.I.[sic] 10th Mass., and the regiments of the brigade of the 2nd Corps will recognize the truth of what I have written of the Battle of the Angle. I refrain from mentioning names of those of my command who were especially brave and efficient as nearly all of the command did such heroic fighting. In giving this version of the Angle proper, I have carefully reviewed all the data in my possession, and while I recognize how nearly impossible it is to give an entirely correct account of any battle, yet I am confident that what I have written herein is as correct as it is possible to be, so far as it concerns my own command and those command immediately on my right, and left. And this I write as the honor of the defense of the Angle has been claimed for Upton’s brigade, which might as well have been at the bottom of a well firing up at the sky for all the loss they did or could inflict upon the enemy, from the position they occupied. Throughout that long night Capt. T. G. Colt was the only one of my staff able to do duty; His great heart and intense will kept him up while the other brave men slept like the dead in the mud and rain. There was no artillery used on our side at or near the Angle save a section (two guns) on the front of the 2nd R.I.; As the fire of these guns was less effective than the infantry fire

[page 87]owing to the enemys[sic] being entirely protected from our fire until they were within a few yards from us, I requested the officer commanding them to withdraw the guns which he did, the guns being in action but a short time. Two oak trees of considerable size were cut down by bullets in front of my command a battle flag was captured by the 37th Mass. The Vermont brigade to the right of Wheaton had some hard fighting and drove the enemy from their front, and Birney’s Div. to my left repulsed any attempt made by the enemy in their front, but the Angle proper, was defended by my command of the 37th and 10th Mass. and 2nd R.I. of my own brigade and what I understand to have been the Excelsior brigade of the 2nd Corps, assisted by the effected cross fire of the 10th New Jersey (after 5 P.M.) The longest and severest fighting was sustained by the 37th Mass and 10th Mass. and the 2nd R.I. My account of the defense of the Angle is mainly limited to the defense of the Angle proper; of the honorable part borne by other commands I could attempt to write only what I saw myself, or heard of at the time.

[page 88]My 13th was given to me for a day of rest for my utterly exhausted command. Far into the day these gallant men lay motionless, asleep in the rain and mud, with no shelter other than the clouds; they look like lines of dead men ready for the “trenches”. As the day wore on, here and there you could see little squads cooking their coffee, then to subside again into their beds of mud. At the close of the day, the Brigade was mostly engaged in pitching their shelter tents, making ready for the night ot rest, protected from the rain.

               For the next few days we were engaged in movements to our left, feeling for a weak place to attack the enemy, or to turn their right flank.

               The Field Officers of the 37th Mass. being wounded, and in Hospital, the Regiment being the largest of my command, I temporarily detailed Lieut. Col. Harlowe of the 7th Mass. to command them. Lieut. Col. Harlowe was in every way a first class man and able officer. The 37th Mass soon learned to appreciate him as he deserved. Grant now seemed to believe that the enemy’s new line, in rear of “The Angle” was the most vulnerable point for us to attack, and on the night of May 17th, the Second Corps formed for attack, supported by Edwards’ and Wheaton’s brigades in right Whelan. As the Second Corps advanced, Wheaton moved beyond my right, when my brigade charged over the enemy’s first line. The mainline of the enemy was heavily fortified, and covered by two lines of abbatis they had also a number of batteries in strong positions, covered by redoubts; their position was apparently impregnable. My Brigade advanced until its right and left were uncovered, and we were in advance of any troops of our line. We held this position within a few yards of the enemy- protected by a slight ridge - until all the attacking force was withdrawn; we were the last to move to the rear, and then only on positive orders from Corps Headquarters. In this attack my command was ably supported by Gen. Bidwell’s Brigade of the 2nd Div. 6th Corps. During the night of the 18th we went in position on Grant’s extreme left, having been without rest or sleep for two days, fighting or matching constantly.

[page 89] The next day, the 19th, Lee took the offensive and moved Ewell’s Corp to Grant’s rear and right to cover Grant’s connection with his basis of supplies, at Acquia Creek. Ewell captured a large wagon train; here he was attacked by General Robert Tyler with his division of heavy artillery. Ewell was forced to retreat with a loss of all his “spoils” and many provisions.

               Another left flank movement was now determined upon, and the 6th Corps was assigned the hazardous duty of covering the movement. The Corps moved by the left flank, the 2nd Corps in the lead, then the Fifth followed by the Ninth. General Lee also moved his army by his right flank - parallel to the Union army, so as to keep between Grant’s army and Richmond. The enemy under General Hill attacked the 6th Corps in the vicinity of the Gayle House, about noon on the 23rd, but was severely defeated; my command inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy, suffering but slight loss themselves. The 6th Corps marched all night May 23rd until we reached Guiness Station. The 24th we marched toward Hanover junction and arrived at the North Anna River. Here we found Lee had thrown his army across our route to contest our farther advance on Richmond, taking a naturally strong position between the North Anna and Little Rivers. Hancock seized the bridge near the railroad. The  5th Corps at Jericho hills found a dangerous ford, and Barlett’s Brigade effected a crossing, when a pontoon bridge was quickly thrown across and the 5th Corps crossed over the river and formed a fortified line.

               Two divisions of Hill’s Corps attacked Warren before his line was completed. Hills attack was at first in part successful, but he was forced to retire by the fire of our field guns; Warren completed his works, and captured many prisoners. During the night my brigade crossed the North Anna River, and were in support of Warren during the day, relieving a part of the 5th Corps in the breastworks before dark. We held this position all night, expected to attack Lee at daylight, but it was found that Lee’s position was so strong, and ours so weak that a successful assault could not be made;

[page 90] the night of the 26th we were again moving by our left flank on to Richmond. This was one of the hardest, severest, marches w ever suffered. My regiments were without rations, not even coffee, were worn and tired, almost beyond endurance, from desperate fighting and hard marching, with no regular rest or sleep, save the day after our “defense of angle”. The morale of my brigade was splendid, they would fight to their last breath but it was pitiful to see them struggle to march through the deep mud, half-starved and exhausted.