Mine Run Campaign / Brandy Station

Judson Bradley

Thursday 26

Clear this A.M. Ordered to march at 6 A.M. Thanksgiving to day & a hard one marched from daylight till midnight & crossed the Rapidan

Friday, November 27, 1863

To day cannonading commenced about 10 A.M. Quite brisk from 1 to 5 P.M. News from Gen. Grant is very favorable. Severe fighting here from 4 P.M. to dark. Results not known save that we held the ground.

Saturday 28

Marched at 1 A.M. towards Fredericksburg. Brought up 3 miles from Chancellorsville. Skirmished all day but not a general engagement. No reliable news.

Sunday 29

Third division marched with the Second Corps around on the Rebels right flank & made toward Orange Court House. No General engagement. Went on picket.

Monday, November 30, 1863

Put on the skirmish line this A.M. No fires allowed very cold. Cannonading on the right. Result not known. Moved at dark to the rear. No mail. Stoped [sic] on Plankhead [?]

Tuesday, December 1

Pleasant this A.M. Lay on Plank Road & at 8 A.M. No signs of a move. Cant [sic] get reliable news. No signs of moving at dark.

Wednesday 2

Moved at 9 P.M. Yesterday in retreat & marched all night crossing the Rapidan at 7 A.M. today. Very tired & hungry we halted after we were a mile across & made coffee. Moved on again at 2 P.M. toward Brandy Station.

Thursday, December 3, 1863

Halted in the woods about a mile across Mountain Creek last night. This A.M. we shoved back towards old camp above Brandy Station. R.R. on orders & supplies coming up. We have been 7 days in the wilderness with out communication with quarter [?] moved. Drew rations. Long roll sounded at ½ past 8 P.M. in 3rd [?] corps. Put up tents at 12 P.M.

Friday 4

Alarm Supposed to be occasioned by a cavalry dash [?] upon our train. Chilly this A.M. Quiet through the day. Cannonading at night. M[three words illegible] today. Recd 2 letters from Luther & 1 from H.W. Johns & papers. Wrote to father.

Oliver Edwards

Several days were now comsumed[sic] in developing Lee’s position,- Meade taking his time as if he felt sure Lee would wait for him, but Lee leisurely withdrew across the Rapidan and went into winter quarters with a strong position on Mine Run. We crossed the river and went into camp near Brandy Station. This was an inconvenient location for wood and water, but we remained here until Meade made ready for the Mine Run Campaign. Meade expected to surprise Lee at Mine Run with his Corps separated so far that he could overwhelm them in detail, and on the 26th we moved over muddy roads and crossed the Rapidan at Jacob’s Mill Ford during the night. Here we lay all the next day and most of the night following, so cold that the men were busy trying to get warm and glad to move again during the night. Daybreak brought the sounds of battle

[page 69]to us, and we were after song array that it was useless to attack in front. Warren was sent with his corps and the 3rd Division of the 6th Corps to make a flank movement by night to the enemy’s left, looking for a vulnerable point in Lee’s lines for attack. Feeling our way until night the next day we lay on arms through the night, expected to attack at daylight. No fires were allowed, and the night was intensely cold. The next morning Warren found the enemy’s position in his front too strong for assault, and so reported to Meade. Meade on investigation endorsed Warren’s opinion and suspended further attempt to carry the enemy’s position. At night our lines fell back into the woods in our rear, where huge fires were built to keep off the cold.

               December 1st we remained quiet, hoping the enemy  would attack us, and at night we marched to the rear, crossing the Rapidan at Ely’s Ford, and after two days more of marching and exposure, sleeping on frozen ground, hungry and half frozen, we were back again in camp at Brandy Station,-after one week’s campaigning that made every man suffer, and feel that we were like “the brave old Duke of York and his 10,000 men”. Gen. Meade was no doubt wise not to attack Lee [?] found him at Mine Run, but the movements to attack were very faulty, and this seemed largely due to a very insufficient knowledge of the roads to be used. Though we were under orders “to be ready to move on the instant on notice” I felt sure no further movement would be made before Spring opened, and the 37th Mass. was ordered to build comfortable winter quarters, in which they regained all their lost vigor, and joyfully made ready for campaigning under Grant.ome hours slow marching in rear of the right of Meade’s front facing Mine Run, and then moved into position the extreme right, expected to charge the enemy’s left front, but the orders did not come. Meade’s success depended upon surprising Lee, and our movements had been so slow and faulty that Lee had even more time than he needed to concentrate his army in so str